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Abstract  
 To prevent private interests from distorting the democratic process, most European 
countries have implemented public funding schemes to guarantee fair competition among 
political parties.  However, very little research has explored the possibility of institutional 
corruption in conjunction with state political party funding. Katz and Mair’s cartel party thesis 
argues state support strengthens ties between political parties and the state at the expense of civil 
society. Oliveira uses organizational theory to point to institutional corruption as a design 
problem. This paper serves as a preliminary exploration of whether Oliveira’s institutional 
corruption model and the cartel party theory can be applied to the European context. 
Comparative case studies of the Czech Republic and Romania, party finance laws and reforms, 
and the existing cartel party literature in these countries are used to construct a possible new 
theoretical framework for analysis. Secondary sources such as public opinion polls and surveys 
are employed to underline the ineffectiveness of political parties’ ability to connect with the 
electorate. This analysis brings the cartel party thesis and institutional corruption theory together 
into a single framework, helping to explain how the cartel party thesis can be framed as a 
problem of organizational design whereby parties drift from their institutional purpose in order to 
ensure their own survival, losing society’s trust in the process. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
Figuring Out the Problem: Political Finance, Corruption, and Democracy  
 Elections are key components of representative democracies. Political parties and 
candidates are chosen to represent the views of civil society in government.  In order to 
garner support, political parties need money to fund party activities and self-maintain 
(Haughton 2012; Nassmacher 2001; Smilov and Toplak 2007). As Fisher and Eisenstadt 
(2004, 619) state: “The study of political finance is fundamental to the study of the 
workings of representative democracy.” Moreover, any study of political finance will 
need to account for corruption, as corruption poses a serious threat to representative 
democracy. If the legitimacy of political parties is compromised, citizens may lose faith 
in the democratic process itself (Caiden 2001).  
As such, the most dangerous aspect of corruption in party finance is the conflict 
of interest that arises in campaign finance legislation. Those creating party finance 
legislation are those who will be regulated by the laws. For example, a party that receives 
a significant amount of donations from charity organizations will be opposed to any piece 
of legislation that effectively bans contributions from charity organizations, even though 
these charity organizations account for a small portion of the party’s base. This party may 
vote differently than what the majority of its constituents desire for two reasons: the party 
will no longer have access to the money contributed from its charity donors; and with this 
significant loss in funding, a party’s ability to effectively campaign for the upcoming 
election will be hindered, thus placing its power in jeopardy.  
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This example illustrates a type of corruption known as monetary influence 
corruption: the sheer presence of money influences how one thinks. Thomas Burke (1997, 
142) explores the “corruptive influence of money” in politics, and argues that “it is 
corrupt for officeholders to perform their public duties with monetary considerations in 
mind” regardless if an “explicit deal is made” with a private interest. Indeed, privately 
interested money threatens representative democracies. Wealthy individuals or 
companies, in theory, shall not have more influence in the democratic process simply due 
to the size of their bank accounts. Governments seek to protect the voice of everyday 
citizens by regulating private donations to political parties and individual candidates and 
implementing reforms that inhibit corruption.  
Many European countries have implemented public funding schemes of political 
parties in order to limit the “potentially disruptive role of interested money” from private 
sources and to guarantee free and fair political competition (van Biezen 2003, 33-4). The 
manner of public funding varies from state to state, but public funding falls into two 
broad categories: direct and indirect funding. Direct funding comes in the form of state 
subsidies to political parties. And indirect funding can be allocated in various ways such 
as free radio and television broadcasting, tax incentives and exemptions, or subsidies to 
research institutes (van Biezen 2003, 37-41).  
Nevertheless, problems begin to emerge as state support of political parties 
increase. As Katz and Mair (1995) point out, this increase in public funding has 
strengthened ties between the state and political parties at the expense of civil society 
(Katz and Mair 1995; see also, van Biezen 2003; van Biezen 2004; van Biezen and 
Kopecky 2014). Political parties’ rising dependence on the state for party revenue has 
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molded political parties into “semi-state agencies” (Katz and Mair 1995, 16). Instead of 
acting as a bridge between civil society and the state, parties become less dependent on 
society for financial support, which ultimately undermines the connection between the 
two.   
Accordingly, as parties become more dependent on the state for party revenue, 
they also become more dependent on the state for their survival (Katz and Mair 1995, 
16). Hence, all parties that receive public funding are dependent on the state for survival 
and thus seek to form a “cartel” to ensure their mutual survival (Katz and Mair 1995, 16). 
This “cartel-party” model of party organization implies that parties take advantage of the 
system in order to retain access to state subsidies, media access, and their overall power: 
“The state becomes an institutionalized structure of support, sustaining insiders while 
excluding outsiders” (Katz and Mair 1995, 16).  
While van Biezen (2004, 704) sees public funding of political parties as a 
“necessary condition for the healthy functioning of political parties” (See also, Haughton, 
2012; 2014; Smilov and Toplak 2007; van Biezen 2003), the influence of state money 
becomes problematic when placed into the context of Katz and Mair’s “cartel-party” 
theory and monetary influence corruption: substantial support from the state changes the 
way political parties think and act, whether or not such thought or action is conscious. 
Parties are focused on retaining their access to state support rather than competing with 
other parties. As Katz and Mair (1995, 20) argue, in some cases, “the limited incentive to 
compete has been replaced by the positive incentive not to compete.” The threat of losing 
state funding (and hence a large portion of party revenue) influences their relationships 
with other parties—that is, competition is replaced by complacency. Maintaining state 
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support outweighs the risks associated with broadening the support structure and 
competing in elections. But this issue goes beyond monetary influence corruption. As 
political parties become institutionalized through state support, political parties may 
become corrupt as institutions.  
Generally, institutional corruption is: “The consequence of an influence within an 
economy of influence that illegitimately weakens the effectiveness of an institution, 
especially by weakening the public trust of that institution” (Lessig 2013, 2). This 
“influence” is a specific tendency that weakens the institution (Lessig 2013, 7). In order 
to determine if a tendency has weakened the institution, a baseline needs to be 
established: the baseline is the basic assumption or purpose of the institution (Lessig 
2011; 2013; Thompson 1995; 2013). Therefore, any sort of deviation from the basic 
institutional purpose is a form of institutional corruption (Lessig 2011; 2013; see also, 
Newhouse 2014). Oliveira (2014) portrays institutional corruption as a “design” 
problem—namely organizational design. Corruption afflicts an institution because it has 
been designed in a way that allows for deviation from its original purpose. According to 
Oliveira (2014, 16), “institutional corruption can be defined as the condition in which an 
institution does not achieve its purpose because its very design induces its members to 
work for other goals.” Two notable words in that statement are “purpose” and “goals,” 
which are interrelated in IC theory. The institution’s purpose is the baseline for analysis:  
in order to accomplish that purpose, an institution sets out particular goals that directly 
lead towards its ascribed purpose; failure to achieve these goals ultimately undermines 
the institution’s ability to fulfill its ascribed purpose (Oliveira 2014, 14). Thus, the goals 
are the means to achieve the end—the institution’s purpose. Oliveira (2014) declares that 
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institutional corruption can occur through three mechanisms: work-breakdown structure, 
motivating for the goal, and formalization and communication of the structure and 
motivation—all of which will be discussed in detail below. Not only is institutional 
corruption a problem of design “as it is designed or intended” but also how an 
institution’s design “manifests itself in practice: that is, as it is apprehended every day by 
the members of an institution” (Oliveira 2014, 23). 
 State subsidies may “weaken the effectiveness” of political parties as institutions 
because political parties become disconnected with civil society, which is a deviation 
from their basic purpose: to bridge the gap between the state and society. Moreover, state 
subsidies erode the public’s trust of political parties when the linkage between the state 
and political parties diminishes the significance of private contributions. Indeed, voter 
turnout can highlight citizen disengagement, and several scholars have looked at the voter 
turnout-corruption nexus in particular (Birch 2010; Kostadinova 2003; 2009; Miles 2015; 
Stockemer, LaMontagne, and Scruggs 2011). If the general population has little trust in 
political parties as a legitimate institution, voter apathy may result in a low turnout in 
elections.  
 While low voter turnout alone is not a direct threat to democracy (Czesnik 2006), 
citizens begin to lose faith in the government when they do not trust leaders or 
institutions or believe they are not getting “good value” (Caiden 2001, 229). Likewise, 
Caiden (2001, 230) expands the reasoning by stating “the feeling of not being able to 
make any difference, of being powerless to get corrective action, shakes [citizens] 
confidence in themselves and in democracy itself.”  The legitimacy of parties and corrupt 
practices in post-communist states is of particular concern, especially in parts of Central 
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and Eastern Europe where “a rolling back of positive progress” on anti-corruption efforts 
has occurred since accession to the European Union (Transparency International 2012a, 
3).  Two states in which this is apparent are the Czech Republic and Romania. These two 
countries provide an opportunity to study the problems of institutional corruption, 
cartelization, and political parties’ disconnection from society more closely. 
Political Parties, Funding, and Voter Turnout in Romania and the Czech Republic 
 Romania and the Czech Republic underwent two distinct democratic transitions 
after the fall of their respective communist regimes. Indeed, their respective transitions 
affected the development of each country’s party system. The Czech Republic’s 
relatively smooth transition was due in part to the dissident movement known as Charter 
77, whereas the lack of any such movement in Romania hindered the transition after the 
removal of Nicolae Ceausescu.  Furthermore, the amount of public subsidies granted to 
political parties as they have emerged in the last thirty years varies markedly: state 
subsidies in the Czech Republic account for the majority of the established political 
parties’ revenues, while parties in Romania receive a relatively small amount of public 
funding from the state budget. 
 On the other hand, citizens in both countries have maintained a relatively high 
amount of distrust towards political parties.  For example, based on the Eurobarometer 
public opinion poll1, which surveys a sample of the population twice a year, from 
October 2004 to November 2014, the respondents were asked to what extent they have 
“trust in the national government”: the average over the 10-year span in the Czech 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Data compiled from the Eurobarometer Interactive Search System and can be seen at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index.cfm?lang=en. The author has calculated the 
averages below.   
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Republic 74.4% of respondents said they “tend not to trust”; the same question was asked 
in Romania, and 69.95% of the respondents held the same view.2  
 In the same poll, over the same time period, respondents were asked whether or 
not they “tend to trust” the national parliament: an average of 82% of the respondents 
answered that they “tend not to trust”; and in Romania, the average over the 10-year span 
was 74% “tend not to trust.”3 Finally, the poll asked the same question regarding political 
parties: an average of 86% of the respondents held that they “tend not to trust” political 
parties in the Czech Republic; and the 10-year average in Romania was 80% of 
respondents “tend not to trust.”4  
 In addition, voter turnout has followed a downward trend in both countries 
following the first democratic elections (see Chart 1 and 2 below), which has generally 
been a common trend among post-communist democracies (Kostadinova 2003; see also, 
Kopecky 2006). 
 Moreover, based on Transparency International’s (TI) “Corruption Perceptions 
Index,” both countries maintain a high level of perceived corruption. TI’s annual study 
examines the level of perceived corruption across all public institutions, 0 being the most 
corrupt and 100 is a perfect score—that is, a country’s public sector is perceived to be 
completely free of corruption—and is based on surveys from a wide range of 
respondents, including businesspeople, citizens, local NGOs, experts, and so on. An 
important caveat, however, is that TI’s annual survey measures the level of perceived 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Respondents were also given the option to claim, “Don’t know” in each survey: the 
average for “Don’t know” in the Czech Republic was 2.6%, and 6.3% in Romania.  
3 3% of the Czech Republic respondents answered, “Don’t know”; the average “Don’t 
know” in Romania came out to 7%.	  	  
4 3% chose “Don’t know” in the Czech Republic, and 6% answered the same in Romania.  
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corruption, not actual corruption.  Accordingly, the average score for the Czech Republic 
from 1997 to 2014 was 46, whereas the average in Romania was 34 (Transparency 
International 2014).5 
Chart 1 and 2: Voter Turnout in Romania and the Czech Republic 
Romanian Parliamentary Elections           Czech Parliamentary Elections 
   
  
 
 
 
 
                                                                      *Indicates early election 
 
Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2013. 
 
Purpose and Methods  
 In an attempt to explain these phenomena, this paper seeks to build a new 
theoretical framework which combines the cartel party thesis and institutional corruption 
theory to help determine whether cartelization results from a problem of organizational 
design and forces parties away from their institutional purpose, losing the electorate’s 
trust in the process. No doubt studying political finance and corruption is challenging: 
“The financing of campaigns and elections is one of the murkiest areas between legal and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Averages calculated by the author. The yearly indexes can be viewed at 
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview.    
Year	  
Voter	  
Turnout	  
1990	   96.33%	  
1992	   84.68%	  
1996	   76.29%	  
1998*	   74.00%	  
2002	   57.95%	  
2006	   64.47%	  
2010	   62.60%	  
2013*	   59.48%	  
Year	  
Voter	  
Turnout	  
1990	   86.19%	  
1992	   76.29%	  
1996	   76.01%	  
2000	   65.31%	  
2004	   58.51%	  
2008	   39.20%	  
2012	   41.76%	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illegal activities” (Funderbunk 2012, 3). Moreover, notwithstanding the “good intentions” 
of many politicians, political finance remains “shrouded in mystery and the subject to 
continual resistance for reform by the political parties themselves” (Fisher and Eisenstadt 
2004, 623).  However, as Holmes (2013, 1168) has pointed out, mixed methods of 
analysis might help provide “a reasonably meaningful picture of the situation.”  
Therefore, as a preliminary exploration of institutional corruption, party drift, and 
organizational design problems, this study utilizes a comparative case study of Romania 
and the Czech Republic and involves a mix of qualitative methods: 1) historical 
institutional analysis of party systems; 2) textual analysis of the laws governing political 
parties 3) the shortcomings of these laws as described by various NGOs such as 
Transparency International and GRECO; and 4) voter turnout and Transparency 
International’s corruption perceptions index highlight a growing disengagement of the 
electorate which may indicate parties are failing to achieve their institutional goals while 
losing their legitimacy in the process. Indeed, these two countries make for an interesting 
comparison because the amount of public subsidies granted to political parties varies 
significantly.6 At the same time, as noted above, the citizenry in both countries have 
maintained a relatively high amount of distrust towards political parties. In addition, 
cartel party literature focusing on each country has revealed trends of cartelization.  
The remaining chapters will examine the literature in the study of political 
corruption and political parties, the cases of Romania and the Czech Republic in depth, 
and then preliminary conclusions will explore the possibility of bringing the cartel thesis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Percentage of state dependency of parties in the Czech Republic is 85%, and 38.7% in 
Romania (Casal Bertoa et. al. 2014). 	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and institutional corruption theory in a single framework, helping frame cartelization as a 
problem of organizational design whereby political parties in Central and East European 
states drift from their institutional purpose. As a preliminary assessment, this paper 
argues that cartelization shifts political parties from their purpose because they have 
failed to achieve the goal of public funding—namely, reducing the damaging effect of 
private funding on perception of corruption. The case studies demonstrate that public 
funding has not necessarily mitigated the need for private funding, and therefore has not 
improved voter turnout or public support for democratic institutions more generally—
both of which have been on the decline. 
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Chapter II: Literature Review 
 
The literature on definitions and measures of corruption, political party funding, 
and disconnects between party purpose and perceptions of civil society is extensive and 
varied. Numerous scholars discuss individual corruption in politics, the “corruptive 
influence of money” on public officials, or the idea that a corrupt individual is one who 
uses public office or resources for private gain (Burke 1997; Heidenheimer 1970; 
Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Warner 2007).  For the purposes of this paper, the 
attention is focused first on definitions of corruption and literature which questions 
whether money influences an institution, rather than a particular individual or group 
(Lessig 2011; 2013; Oliveira 2014; Thompson 1995; 2013). Subsequently, the focus 
shifts to Katz and Mair’s (1995) cartel party thesis and scholars who have looked at party 
finance and party systems. A brief discussion of literature on political parties and funding 
in Romania and the Czech Republic is also provided.  
Corruption, Institutional Corruption, and Organizational Design Problems 
 Corruption is a difficult concept to define with precision. As Caiden (2001, 231) 
states: the “worst aspect of corruption: its many different forms.” Despite differences 
among scholars who seek to define political corruption, the general consensus is that an 
individual uses public office or resources for private gain (Burke 1997; Caiden 2001; 
Funderbunk 2012; Johnston 2005; Warner 2007). Scott (1972) proposes three criteria for 
determining what is corrupt: public opinion, public interest, and legal norms. But those 
three criteria are not much help in narrowing the definition of political corruption because 
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those three criteria vary in different systems of government, societies, and cultures 
(Burke 1997; Caiden 2001; Funderbunk 2012; Johnston 2005; Warner 2007).  
 Thompson (1995) argues that corruption goes beyond the use of public office for 
private gain in a democracy in that private interests subvert the “rigors” of the democratic 
process, or specific actions also involve the “violation of the norms, not just procedures” 
of a democratic process (Warner 2007, 15).  
 Funderbunk (2012, 1) defines corruption as “actions by public officials that may 
be legal or illegal but are questionable in terms of the integrity of a system of legitimate 
government and the rule of law.” Therefore, Funderbunk (2012) believes political 
corruption should be defined more broadly because those in power are able to decide 
what is “corrupt” and what actions are legal. Caiden (2001, 231) aligns with this 
reasoning, arguing that the “corrupt are clever at disguising their corrupt acts and 
covering any traces.”  
 Given the difficulty of detecting corruption, scholars undertake various methods 
in studying corruption, be it a political-economy approach (Rose-Ackerman 1978), a 
legal approach (Burke 1997), an ethical approach (Thompson 1995), or a systemic 
approach (Johnston 2005). Each method uses a different form of measurement to produce 
results. Nevertheless, precise measurement of corruption remains a problem across all 
methods.  
 As Caiden (2001, 232) asserts: “Corruption is impossible to measure with any 
degree of accuracy simply because much will be hidden and never known.” 
Organizations such as Transparency International, Freedom House, and the World Bank 
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produce specific country reports and cross-regional comparisons that measure corruption 
and the perception of corruption. But as Knack (2007) points out, even those 
organizations’ measurement techniques are, to a certain extent, flawed.  
 The purpose of this paper, however, is to determine whether money influences an 
institution—rather than a particular individual or group—to the extent that it deviates 
from its purpose, weakening its effectiveness in the process (Lessig, 2011; 2013; Oliveira 
2014; Thompson 1995; 2013). Thompson (1995) set the groundwork for institutional 
corruption research in his work Ethics in Congress: From Individual to Institutional 
Corruption (See also, Thompson 2013). Here he argues, “any action performed under 
conditions that tend to violate one of the principles of legislative ethics constitutes 
institutional corruption” (Thompson 1995, 32).  Furthermore, he claims, “the fact that a 
legislator acts under institutional conditions that tend to create improper influence is 
sufficient to establish corruption, whatever the legislator’s motive” (Thompson 1995, 32).   
This has been followed by work by Della Porta and Vannucci (1999) who argued that 
access to government resources available to a ruling party could give rise to party 
corruption, and control of policy-making activities may in turn create party corruption in 
the legislative systems (See also Casal Bertoa, et. al., 2014). 
 While these scholars laid the foundation for institutional corruption, Lessig (2013, 
6) goes a step further with regard to the relationship between gain and service, and the 
relationship “between that relationship and the legislative or democratic process.” 
Although Thompson’s works (1995; 2013) imply that a tendency may “weaken” or 
“damage” the legislative or democratic processes, Lessig (2013, 7) explicitly states one 
must “establish that that tendency weakens the legislative or democratic processes.” And 
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in order to do so, both Lessig and Thompson propose that one must understand the basic 
assumption or purpose of the institution, and any deviation from the basic institutional 
purpose constitutes institutional corruption (Lessig 2011; 2013; Thompson 1995; 2013; 
see also, Newhouse 2014).  
 Thompson deems legislative independence as a proper baseline: as long as a 
legislative body is “independent” of improper influence and its deliberations are made 
“on the merits” (Thompson 2013, 5). Lessig concurs with Thompson that a legislative 
body shall be independent, but Lessig calls this independence “the proper dependence” 
(Lessig 2011, 130). Hence, a different kind of institutional corruption evolves from 
Lessig’s work: dependence corruption. Dependence corruption describes an institution 
that deviates from its proper dependency due to an alternative dependency. This 
alternative, or conflicting, dependency, Lessig argues, is one kind of influence that can 
give rise to institutional corruption (Lessig 2011, 130; 2013, 17).  
 Lessig’s works (2011; 2013) are centered on campaign finance of the U.S. 
Congress. In his view, Congress’ proper dependency is upon “the People” alone, just as 
the Framers prescribed. However, the conflicting dependency comes from what Lessig 
calls, “the Funders”: those who contribute a substantial amount to legislators’ campaigns. 
Congressional candidates, Lessig argues, become dependent upon “the Funders” due to 
the significant (and disproportionate) amount of money they receive from a small group 
of people, which is evidence that Congress has deviated from its proper purpose. Thus, 
“permitting a separate dependence to evolve corrupts the design that ‘the People’ were to 
be the exclusive dependence” (Lessig 2013, 17).  
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 While Thompson and Lessig have focused on corruption and campaign finance in 
the context of the United States, institutional corruption has rarely been applied in the 
European context. Circumstances differ significantly in Europe with regard to political 
parties and campaign finance. Parties are organized and funded in ways that make 
comparison to the United States’ context problematic. As Oliveira (2014, 4) notes, the 
trick is to find a way to make the concept of institutional corruption more adaptable. 
 Oliveira (2014, 4) retains the underlying components of IC theory, but broadens 
IC theory asserting ‘institutional purpose’ has different characteristics and implications in 
different settings. Equally important is Oliveira’s proposition that “some situations 
demand analysis from different perspectives” and demand that “we work with multiple 
[institutional] purposes simultaneously” (Oliveira 2014, 11).  In fact, Oliveira argues a 
single situation of institutional corruption may require multiple levels of analysis 
(Oliveira 2014, 11). The definition of an institution’s ‘purpose’ determines the level of 
analysis: “The institutional purpose need not be defined by entities at the level of the 
institution (e.g., founders or shareholders); even though it exists at that level—it is, after 
all, the institution’s purpose—it can be defined by entities at a higher level (the industry 
or the societal level, for example)” (Oliveira 2014, 12). Indeed, Oliveira argues that IC 
theory ought to be flexible enough “to allow for the analysis of an institution whose 
purpose might be defined outside of it, or even imposed on it” (Oliveira 2014, 12). This 
flexibility might allow for an analysis of political parties in different cultural contexts, 
even when those political parties may have purposes explicitly defined by constitutions or 
laws.  
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 Using organizational theory, Oliveira portrays institutional corruption as a 
“design” problem—that is, organizational design (Oliveira 2014, 5). Corruption afflicts 
an institution because it has been designed in a way that allows for deviation: 
“Institutional corruption can be defined as the condition in which an institution does not 
achieve its purpose because its very design induces its members to work for other goals” 
(Oliveira 2014, 16). The institution’s purpose is the baseline for analysis; and, in order to 
fulfill that purpose, an institution sets particular goals wherein accomplishing those goals 
fulfills the purpose (Oliveira 2014, 14). Thus, the goals are the means to achieve the 
end—the institution’s purpose. This ‘means and ends’ concept—or as Oliveira calls it, 
“work breakdown structure,” is the first of three mechanisms through which institutional 
corruption occurs. 
 The second mechanism deals with motivation, specifically motivation to achieve 
a particular goal. Oliveira divides motivation into two types: direct and indirect (Oliveira 
2014, 20). Direct motivation refers to a situation in which an individual working within 
the institution is motivated to achieve the goal and strives towards fulfilling the 
institution’s purpose, which ultimately allows the institution to maintain its course 
(Oliveira 2014, 20). On the other hand, institutional corruption surfaces when indirect 
motivation is present. Individuals work towards a reward instead of “working for any 
institutional purpose as it is defined for them in the reward mechanism (Oliveira 2014, 
21, emphasis in original). Indeed, the “reward mechanism” distracts individuals from the 
institutional purpose and, consequently, institutional corruption presents itself (Oliveira 
2014, 21). 
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 The third mechanism laid out by Oliveira is formalization and communication: 
“work breakdown structure and motivation plans of an institution need to be formalized 
and communicated to its members” (Oliveira 2014, 22). In fact, according to Oliveira, 
institutional corruption occurs when a gap exists between “rule-in-context” and “rule-as-
intended” (Oliveira 2014, 22). Institutional corruption may occur because the rules, laws, 
or procedures were formalized and communicated in defective ways. Indeed the drift can 
be purposeful: “members may use the gap mentioned to explore ways to game the 
rules…only to exploit the gaps later” (Oliveira 2014, 23). 
 For Oliveira (2014, 26), the fact that an institution requires a design to achieve its 
purposes means that, “in most cases, this design will be created according to the accepted 
norms of designing institutions; the design is usually compatible with the legal 
framework of society.” Therefore, different societies will have different design schemes, 
and studying these schemes can help one understand and compare political parties and 
forms of institutional corruption in different settings.   
Literature on Political Parties, Public Funding, and Cartelization 
 Along with the academic work on institutional corruption theory, scholars have 
also examined political parties and funding. The concept of a political party in Europe 
has evolved over time, specifically regarding its relationship with society (Blyth and Katz 
2005; Carothers 2006; Katz and Mair 1995; van Biezen 2004; van Biezen and Kopecky 
2007; 2014). Some scholars suggest this relationship is changing due to the way political 
parties are funded (Katz and Mair 1995; van Biezen 2004; van Biezen and Kopecky 
2007; 2014).  
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 With a decrease in mass party membership across Europe, governments sought to 
compensate the decrease in party revenue by providing public subsidies to political 
parties, which also help guarantee free and fair political competition and limit the 
influence of private individuals and companies (van Biezen 2003; 2004; van Biezen and 
Kopecky 2007; 2014; Warner 2007). While some cast public funding of political parties 
in a positive light (van Biezen 2003; 2004; van Biezen and Kopecky 2007; 2014), others 
are more cynical (Katz and Mair 1995; Roper 2002; Smilov and Toplak 2007; Warner 
2007).  
 Public funding was introduced relatively early in the democratic development 
process in newer democracies compared to older democracies to help solidify a 
multiparty system (van Biezen 2004; van Biezen and Kopecky 2014). However, this was 
especially problematic in countries with communist legacies because of their histories 
with political corruption (Carothers 2006; Roper 2002; Smilov and Toplak 2007; van 
Biezen 2004). In fact, the introduction of public funding schemes post-communist 
countries may have been counterintuitive for two reasons. First, it may have removed the 
incentive for political parties to create a connection with civil society (Roper 2002; van 
Biezen 2004; van Biezen and Kopecky 2014). Second, without effective regulation and 
transparency requirements in place, state funding could not provide a more level playing 
field because it served as a supplement to, rather than a substitute for, illegal 
contributions thereby providing an advantage to parties engaged in corrupt practices 
(Roper 2002; Smilov and Toplak 2007; van Biezen 2004; van Biezen and Kopecky 2007; 
2014).  
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 The main concern with public funding is that political parties become dependent 
upon the state. Katz and Mair (1995) developed a new type of party to account for this 
dependency: the cartel party. In theory, the cartel party evolves from increased 
dependence on the state. The linkage between the state and political parties strengthens at 
the expense of parties’ relationships with civil society (Katz and Mair 1995). In other 
words, as parties receive more funding from the state, the importance to connect with 
voters for support decreases. Consequently, political parties become institutions or “semi-
state agents” rather than private associations that act as a “bridge” between the state and 
civil society (Katz and Mair 1995). Perceptions of corruption can create distrust and 
erosions of civil society, a condition which seems to have become particularly prevalent 
in post-communist states (Zakaria 2012). 
 The concept of a cartel emerges when one looks at the party system as a whole. A 
political party that is dependent on the state needs continuous state access to compete in 
elections—it is dependent on the state for survival. Therefore, a new strategy evolves, 
one in which parties with access to state resources focus on mutual survival by 
transcending the need for survival in elections and forming a cartel whereby all parties 
survive by retaining access to state funding (Katz and Mair 1995). Hence, “the state 
becomes an institutionalized structure of support, sustaining insiders while excluding 
outsiders” (Katz and Mair 1995, 16). Parties are able to exclude “outsiders” because, “in 
their role as governors, [parties] are ultimately responsible for both the rules regarding 
state subventions as well as for the amounts of money and resources that are made 
available” (Katz and Mair 1995, 15). Moreover, the cartel party is able to remain intact 
because state support is often tied to previous performance in elections, which gives the 
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“insiders” a substantial advantage (Katz and Mair 1995, 15; see also, Roper 2002, 182). 
Parties with state access need not compete with one another for funding; stated succinctly 
by Katz and Mair: “the limited incentive to compete has been replaced by the positive 
incentive not to compete” (Katz and Mair 1995, 20).   
Literature on Political Parties in Romania and the Czech Republic 
 The cartel party thesis has been applied to various countries around the world, 
including the two case studies in this paper, Romania and the Czech Republic. In fact, the 
Romanian case has gained far more attention compared to the Czech Republic in terms of 
cartel party application. Roper (2002, 186) discusses the development of Romania’s party 
finance laws and their impact on the party system and corruption, and finds that 
“Romania has placed party system consolidation as its primary goal.” In addition, Roper 
(2007, 108) finds that state finance has “had a marginal influence” on Romania’s party 
system as a whole, but other mechanisms have been more influential in shaping the 
Romanian party system even though public funding can be essential to the electoral 
performance of individual parties.  
 Likewise, Gherghina and Chiru (2013, 108) provide a detailed examination of 
Romanian party legislation from 1990 to 2010, which, they conclude, has increased in 
both complexity and severity, allowing parties to “exploit the weaknesses” within this 
complex legislative framework. Additionally, they argue this trend is cyclical: existing 
loopholes are filled with new, more complex legislation, only to open up more loopholes 
for parties to exploit (Gherghina and Chiru 2013).  
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 Finally, Popescu and Soare (2014, 405) argue that the Romanian case exhibits 
“cartelization with a twist”: “The [Romanian] system is not meant to control access to 
public funding for party politics…but from an interest to limit access to privileged state 
contracts and patronage positions” since state funds are not fundamental for the main 
parties’ revenues. Romanian policies benefit the large established parties and financial 
support is lacking for those who would need it most—namely small and new parties. The 
resulting situation is that “small parties depend on the big ones for survival (inclusion in 
alliances to help them pass the electoral threshold)”; therefore, small parties’ survival 
rests “on the needs of the established parties rather than the needs and demands of the 
voters” (Popescu and Soare 2014, 404).  
 Literature regarding the case of the Czech Republic has largely focused on the 
development of the party system from its inception (Klima 1998; Kopecky 1995), its 
impact on political party finance (van Biezen 2003), and the role public funding has 
played in providing stability to the Czech party system (Linek and Outly 2008). 
Likewise, Casal Bertoa and van Biezen (2014) trace the development of party regulation 
in the Czech Republic in their larger analysis of post-communist European countries. 
Nonetheless, Haughton (2014) provides an analysis of cartelization in the Czech Republic 
from 1989 to 2012 in which he ascribes the gradual cartelization of the Czech party 
system to the “permissive environment” for Czech political parties, which has ultimately 
acted as a restraint for smaller parties.  
 As this literature review has shown, while extensive work has been done in areas 
of party finance, a gap exists in the examination of the possible drift of political parties in 
Central and Eastern Europe from their institutional purpose and whether the explanation 
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of that drift might be found in the combination of the cartel thesis and institutional 
corruption theory. In the following two chapters, examination of key elements such as the 
original purpose of political parties, the design of party funding laws, and cartelization 
trends will help illuminate to what extent increased ties between the state and political 
parties foster public distrust. 
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Chapter III: Romania 
 
 Turning to a more detailed look at the case of Romania, this chapter will begin to 
show how institutional corruption theory and theories of cartelization can be intertwined 
to identify party drift and potentially account for the low levels of public trust and 
confidence in political parties. This chapter will first provide an overview of Romania’s 
party system development and institutional design issues. Second, important laws and 
regulations regarding political party funding are identified. Third, a discussion of the 
Romanian party system’s cartelization will provide context for the last section, which 
attempts to draw a connection between the cartel thesis and institutional corruption.  
Development of the Romanian Party System 
 Romania’s transition out of communism was the bloodiest in Central and Eastern 
Europe. The December Revolution and the subsequent coup ‘d’état left the country in 
disarray. Unlike the other revolutions in the region, Romania did not have an organized 
and effective opposition movement. The National Salvation Front (FSN) emerged out 
Ceausescu’s regime and became the leading party in Romania after 1989. Many members 
of the FSN were also members of the former communist party, which gave the 
impression the revolution was simply a façade for a planned coup ‘d’état (Feffer 1992, 
203). Nevertheless, the FSN remained popular across the country, especially in rural 
regions, and would briefly dominate Romanian post-communist politics. However, 
Romania’s transition underwent a shaky start, and consolidation of the party system took 
more time than other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Yet despite the early 
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fragmentation following the revolution in 1989, the Romanian party system has 
experienced gradual stabilization in the 2000s (Gherghina and Jiglau 2011).  
 At the same time, the number of successful political competitors has decreased as 
the role of political parties has become more clear and the laws more restrictive and 
complex (Popescu and Soare 2014, 392). In 1990, for example, 16 political parties were 
elected into Parliament, and yet by 1992, this number decreased to seven. By 1996, six 
parties were represented, and by 2008, party competitors in parliamentary seats were 
down to four. In fact, the Romanian Chamber of Deputies has seen only two new parties 
gain representation on their own since 1992 (PRM – the Greater Romania Party in 1992; 
and PPDD – Popular Party Dan Diaconescu in 2012), both of which were protest parties 
with strong nationalist and populist undertones (Popescu and Soare 2014, 399). New and 
small parties have largely gained representation in parliament primarily through alliances 
with larger parties (Popescu and Soare 2014, 400). In addition, the Romanian party 
system has exhibited considerable fluidity in terms of party alliances and coalitions: since 
1992 each parliamentary party has joined forces with every other competitor in the 
composition of coalition governments, with the exception of radical right and ethnic 
parties (Gherghina and Chiru 2013, 110). Therefore, a discussion of each parliamentary 
election in terms alliances and coalitions as well as parties entering and exiting the 
system would be cumbersome: parties often change names and/or programs and 
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politicians have shown little allegiance, as many have changed parties or created off-
shoots of existing parties.7  
 For example, the Social Democratic Party (PSD) is the largest Romanian party, 
and was formerly known as the Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN) and the 
Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR). The PSD has won five out of the six 
national elections, has been the main component of the government coalition three times, 
has participated in a minority government, and took part twice for a year in the recent 
government coalitions of 2008 and 2012. The PSD absorbed the Party of Social 
Democracy in Romania (PSDR) in 2001, and has formed electoral alliances with the 
Conservative Party (PC) for the 2000, 2004, and 2008 parliamentary elections. The party 
suffered a split halfway through the 1996-2000 parliamentary term when several political 
leaders formed an intraparliamentary party, The Alliance for Romania (APR), which 
failed to attain any seats in the 2000 parliamentary elections (Gherghina and Chiru 2013, 
110).  
Non-Party Finance Laws in Romania 
 The Romanian constitution provides only “weak direction” on the question of 
party regulation (Popescu and Soare 2014, 390). As is the case with the rest of post-
communist Europe (see van Biezen 2012), the Romanian constitution (1991) emphasizes 
political pluralism as “one of the supreme values” (Art. 1(3)) and as a “condition and 
safeguard” of a democratic state (Art. 8(1)). In addition, the Romanian constitution also 
defines restriction on party membership: magistrates, active military personnel, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) is an exception to this 
trend. As an ethnic party, UDMR has maintained stable support since its inception in 
post-communist Romania (Gherghina and Chiru 2013, 111).   
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police, and categories of civil servants cannot be part of political parties (Art. 37(3), 
1991; Art. 40(3), revised 2003). This indicates a similar trend among other post-
communist democracies aiming “to maintain clear boundaries between political parties 
and the institution of the state” (van Biezen 2012, 204)  
 The Law on Elections to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate (68/1992) 
established a 3% threshold for single parties, with coalition parties needing up to 8% of 
the vote depending on the size of the coalition. Parliamentary parties were allotted at least 
twice as much media access than extra-parliamentary parties, and media access was 
granted in proportion to a party’s number of seats (Romanian Law 68/1992, art. 46(4)). 
Indeed, the electoral threshold had the greatest impact on the Romanian party system: the 
number of parties elected to the lower house in 1992 was less than half from the 1990 
election (Roper 2007, 103). In effect, these small parties who missed the threshold either 
coalesced with other smaller parties or ceased to exist altogether (Roper 2007, 103). 
However, the law did not allocate any state support to political parties during the 1992 
national elections, as the parliament failed to implement the provision (Gherghina and 
Chiru 2013, 115).  
 Romanian Law 27/1996 increased the membership requirements for party 
registration from 251 to 10,000, represented in at least 15 counties with no less than 300 
in each county (Art. 17(1b)). Certainly this provision sought to further consolidate the 
party system by reducing the amount of parties: 250 registered parties from 1990-1996 to 
57 parties by September 1996 (OSCE 1996, 6).  
  Nevertheless, an emergency ordinance passed in 2000 (63/2000) amended the 
Law on Elections (68/1992), and raised the electoral threshold to 5%, and 8-10% for 
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alliances. In its post-election observation, the OSCE (2001, 5) notes, “the 10% threshold 
for political formations may be overly restrictive” relative to international norms. 
Moreover, raising the threshold to 5% indicates that parties sought to further consolidate 
the party system “rather than providing a level playing field” (Roper 2007, 108). Indeed, 
this signified a turn in the Romanian party system’s development. The second decade of 
post-communist development follows a path “characterized by the attempt to maintain 
the status quo and prevent extra-parliamentary political forces from gaining 
representation” (Gherghina and Chiru 2013, 116). Such an attempt came in 2003 with a 
revision to the Law on Political Parties (14/2003), in which new parties were required to 
have at least 25,000 members from at least 18 counties and not less than 700 founding 
members in each county (Art. 19(3)).  
 In 2008, the Romanian electoral system changed from a proportional 
representation system to a mixed system. Beyond changing parties’ and candidates’ 
campaign strategies, this reform has had little effect on the party system as a whole 
(Armeanu and Fesnic 2010; Orgau 2011). Nonetheless, this modification brought forth an 
exponential increase in campaign spending during the 2008 national elections, shifting 
the burden away from political parties to the candidates running in elections, and 
increasing the prevalence of all-encompassing patronage schemes (Gherghina and Chiru 
2013, 123).  
 The framework presented above has indeed become more restrictive over time. 
The increases in electoral threshold and party registration requirements have created a 
challenging environment for new parties to enter parliament. And even though these laws 
were passed under the rhetorical justification to “fight fragmentation” and promote 
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stability, the results have been “modest at best” (Gherghina and Chiru 2013, 399). 
Therefore, this “artificial stabilization” has created an environment that limits access to 
new parties and entrenches established parties, and forces Romanian parties to work for 
other goals to break into the party system. This drift can be seen more clearly when party 
finance regulations are also taken into consideration.  
The Development of Romanian Party Finance Laws 
 Issues of party purpose and political party system design are just one aspect of the 
institutional corruption and cartelization puzzle. Another key piece is the development of 
laws related specifically to party finance. The Law on Political Parties (27/1996) brought 
forth party finance regulations, introduced a public funding scheme, and established 
sources of party funding (Art. 33). State subventions were allocated in a four-step 
procedure, and the amount allocated could not exceed 0.04% of the state budget in a 
given year (Art. 39). The first phase equally distributed a base subvention totaling one-
third of the total amount to parliamentary parties. Second, the remaining two-thirds were 
divided among the same parties in proportion to their seat count, up to a maximum of five 
base subventions. Third, the leftovers were distributed to all the parties garnering at least 
two percent of the votes in the previous election, which could not amount to a share 
larger than the base subvention. Finally, the remaining funds were again distributed to 
parliamentary parties in proportion to their seats (Art. 39). Clearly, this allocation process 
heavily favored parliamentary parties, as extra-parliamentary parties received next to 
nothing (Gherghina and Chiru 2013, 116). But the law was passed in the spring of 1996, 
which meant the funding scheme had only been in action for a few months prior to the 
November 1996 national elections. As a result, Roper (2007, 105) suggests “it is doubtful 
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that state finance had any meaningful impact on the electoral fortunes of the smaller 
parties” because both smaller and newer parties “had a difficult time entering parliament” 
in 1996.  
 Other sources of funding were membership fees, donations and contributions, and 
revenues from party activities (Art. 33(1)). Individual membership fees were to be less 
than 50 times the minimum national salary (Art. 34(3)). Yearly party donations could not 
exceed 0.005 percent of the state budget revenue; this figure increased to 0.01 percent in 
an election year. Individual donations were capped at 100 times the minimum salary, 
whereas institutional donations could not exceed 500 times the minimum national salary 
(Art. 35).  
 Romanian Law 43/2003 maintained the sources of funding prescribed by Law 
68/1996, but adjusted the revenue thresholds for private contributions: 0.025% of the 
state budget and 0.05% in electoral years. Furthermore, individuals could make donations 
of up to 200 times the minimum salary while companies were permitted to contribute up 
to 500 times the minimum salary (Art. 5). The state subsidy scheme remained the same 
except for one minor provision: in the third phase, extra-parliamentary parties received 
public funding if the party obtained a maximum of one percent of the votes below the 
electoral threshold (Art. 9). In effect, the public funding threshold increased to 4% for a 
single party, and 7% to 9% for alliances consisting of two, three, and four or more 
parties, respectively. This minor change proved particularly advantageous for established 
parties, as no extra-parliamentary parties competing in the 2000 and 2004 elections were 
entitled to state subventions (Gherghina and Chiru 2013, 117).  
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 Additionally, Law 43/2003 introduced two new important regulations on political 
parties. On the one hand, the law imposed maximum expenditure caps to political parties 
relative to minimum salaries: every candidate to a seat in any of the two Chambers of 
Parliament was entitled to expenses of maximum 150 times the minimum national salary 
(Art. 21). On the other hand, Law 43/2003 established strict control mechanisms and 
sanctions, which were overseen by the Court of Accounts (Art. 24-32).   
 A new law came into effect in 2006 (334/2006), which had several implications 
for the regulation of political parties. First, the law increased the permitted amount of 
private contributions by calculating it in relation to state budget revenues rather than state 
subvention amounts (Art. 7(3)). Second, state subventions also took into account the 
share of votes obtained in local elections: 75 percent of the state subventions are 
proportionally divided among parliamentary parties, and 25 percent of the subventions 
are divided in proportion to the share of votes among the parties that have at least 50 
county councilors (Art. 15-16). And although Law 334/2006 has introduced more 
sanctions than the previous law, it does not carry a significant deterrent effect; the 
Permanent Electoral Authority, the body charged with overseeing control mechanisms, 
had little capacity for supervising financial activities, as its responsibilities were not 
clearly differentiated from those of the Court of Accounts (Gherghina and Chiru 2013, 
117). Finally, the limits of expenditures were loosened: every candidate was entitled to 
expenditures of a maximum 350 times the minimum salary (Art. 30). 
 With these laws in mind, the next section will discuss their implications and 
cartelization in detail, specifically by highlighting previous scholarly work focusing on 
Romanian cartelization, which reveals a unique type of cartel party system in Romania.  
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Cartelization in Romania 
 Due to the fragility of the party system early in Romania’s post-communist 
experience, development needed to take place, and some laws and reforms—while on the 
surface may indicate cartelization—were absolutely necessary to consolidate a fledgling 
party system in Romania. Nonetheless, some reforms laid the groundwork for a cartel-
like system to emerge. The electoral threshold has played a significant role in reducing a 
substantial amount of parties, which suggests that Romanian politicians have “placed 
party system consolidation as their primary goal rather than providing a level playing 
field” (Roper, Moraru, and Iorga 2008, 154). Moreover, the party finance scheme in 
Romania favors parliamentary parties, and the “lack of financial controls has lead to 
repeated charges of corruption” (Roper, Moraru, and Iorga 2008, 143). Gherghina and 
Chiru (2013) have likewise found the allocation of public funding to have become more 
restrictive and substantially more advantageous for parliamentary parties over time. In 
addition, Romanian parties have “developed tools to indirectly obtain and use state 
resources for electoral purposes,” such as engaging in patronage practices and awarding 
“lavish” public contracts, which, indicates that “private donations are encouraged by the 
use of public money” (Gherghina and Chiru 2013, 123-24). Likewise, Romanian parties’ 
lives are “dominated” by interest groups and clientelistic relationships (TI 2012b, 133). 
 Therefore, the Romanian situation displays “cartelization with a twist” (Popescu 
and Soare 2014, 402).  In fact, the party system is not meant to control access to public 
funding, as in reality state funds are “not fundamental” to the finances of the main parties 
but from an interest to “limit access to privileged state contracts and patronage positions” 
(Popescu and Soare 2014, 405). Indeed, while the financial support is lacking for small or 
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new parties—those who need it most—the policies clearly benefit the large parties; in 
effect small parties become dependent on forming alliances with the large parties for 
survival (Popescu and Soare 2014, 404). As a result, small parties’ survival depends on 
the “needs of the established parties rather than the needs or demands of the voters”; 
therefore small parties with the largest financial endowments or other appealing resources 
are valuable resources for large parties, regardless of party function or program (Popescu 
and Soare 2014, 404-5).    
  Although Romania’s party system exhibits “cartelization with a twist,” the next 
section will make the connection to institutional corruption by looking at the institutional 
design and its shortcomings in relation to Oliveira’s IC model.  
Application of Institutional Corruption 
 Analysis of the party law and party system development fits the cartel party 
thesis, although it differs slightly—that is, the Romanian party system exhibits 
“cartelization with a twist” (Popescu and Soare 2014). Romanian law makes it 
challenging to establish a new party, and even when a party is established, the electoral 
threshold of 5% poses a further challenge for new parties to enter. Therefore, the 
Romanian party system is “designed to perpetuate the existing parliamentarian parties” 
(TI 2012b, 124). Furthermore, the lack of transparency and accountability regarding 
political party funding allow for abuses of power to take place among political parties (TI 
2012b, 11). Moreover, the oversight of the biggest parties is “difficult and ineffective,” 
which hinders the competition between the established parties and the new parties (TI 
2012b, 126).  Ambiguities within the laws governing political parties allow in practice 
“the existence of an uncontrolled source of revenue,” as parties are not obliged to declare 
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the total number of member donations, which leads to significant amounts of money 
declared by parties as being members’ contributions or donations when in fact the money 
can be used for “unregistered sponsorships” (TI 2012b, 124). As a result, interest groups 
and clientelistic relationships “dominate” Romanian parties’ lives, as candidates of 
political parties are generally recruited from groups of businessmen (TI 2012b, 124).  
 Indeed, while the Romanian party system does not display a conventional cartel 
party system, the party system’s design leaves political parties prone to institutional 
corruption, especially through Oliveira’s formalization and communication mechanism. 
The growing complexity of party law over time, compounded with its many ambiguities, 
exemplify the gap between “rule-in-context” and “rule-as-intended” through which 
institutional corruption can occur. This gap indeed generates drift in Romania, as parties 
can purposefully game the rules—that is, follow the letter of the law “while undermining 
its intent and advancing other goals” (Oliveira 2014, 23). In effect, this “rule-making 
game” can influence the design of the institution such that parties or politicians can 
“exploit the design flaws for their benefit” (Oliveira 2014, 23). Moreover, GRECO 
(2010, 24) points out that Law 334/2006 is at times “over-ambitious” and “imposes many 
limitations” that are difficult to enforce in practice. Similarly, Gherghina and Chiru 
(2013, 108) find that political parties have indeed “managed to exploit the weaknesses of 
the increasingly complex legislative framework” by using the flaws to exploit state 
resources. And in turn a cyclical process occurs: parties fill the existing loopholes only to 
later identify other flaws in which they are able to exploit (Gherghina and Chiru 108-9).  
 Clearly the Romanian party system has been set up in a way so as to minimize 
risk from outside parties, as explained earlier, which indicates drift from the original 
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purpose of political parties towards the goals of established parties. New parties in 
Romania are faced with challenges breaking in, and, as such, are forced to work for other 
goals in order to break into the system—namely, meeting the financial needs of 
established parties rather than serving the demands and interests of voters.  
 Consequently, if citizen preferences take a backseat to those of the larger parties, 
political parties fit the notion of institutional corruption as they are forced to work for the 
goals of the established parties: access to state resources, such as awarding public 
contracts or engaging in patronage, becomes a mode for survival and the main driver of a 
political party’s existence. The opportunity to be “let inside” does not result from having 
a particular political program or voter base. Instead, a small party “rich in financial/media 
backing can obtain alliance status in spite of no actual electoral viability or popular 
support on their own” (Popescu and Soare 2014, 405). Or, to put it another way: financial 
resources are the most essential element in Romanian party politics. Nonetheless, this 
environment of party politics does not come without a cost: the legitimacy of political 
parties among the population and the trust of the citizens is significantly low; 
consequently the “linkage between the political parties and the civil society is almost 
absent” (TI 2012b, 133). 
 Romania’s design problem differs from that of the Czech Republic, which will be 
explored in detail in the following chapter. Contrary to the Czech Republic, where the 
design problem exists within party finance laws and regulation, Romania’s non-finance 
laws are set up in such a way as to encourage drift: the relative difficulty in creating a 
new party, as well as the high electoral threshold coupled with low levels of public 
funding, embolden smaller parties to pursue goals different from those necessary to 
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achieve their purpose. The following chapter will highlight the difference in design 
problems between the two case studies, and it will also demonstrate the versatility of 
Oliveira’s model in applying institutional corruption to varying contexts.  
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Chapter IV: Czech Republic 
 
 The Czech Republic makes for an interesting comparison with Romania, as public 
funding plays a more defining role in party politics and political party revenues. At the 
same time, the Czech Republic experienced a relatively smooth post-communist 
transition and the party system quickly developed. This case study will show that 
although public funding is more influential in Czech party politics, cartelization also acts 
as institutional drift due to a problem of design. The following section will provide a brief 
overview of the Czech party system before a detailed discussion of Czech party laws. 
Then, similar to the previous case study, discussion of cartelization will be followed by 
further elaboration on party finance laws and discussion of institutional corruption. 
Development of the Czech Party System 
 The democratic transition in Czechoslovakia differed significantly than that of 
Romania. On November 17, 1989, student demonstrations began in the center of Prague, 
which ultimately triggered the Velvet Revolution and brought down the communist 
regime in Czechoslovakia. Civic Forum (OF), the leading opposition movement, was 
established days after the demonstrations began to participate in dialogue with the 
communists. By the end of December, most of the communists were replaced with 
opposition members, and a coalition government of mostly non-communists was created. 
On December 29, 1989, Vaclav Havel was elected president of the Czechoslovak 
Republic, and Czechoslovakia’s democratic transition was underway. 
 While Civic Forum was the leading opposition movement in the Czech region of 
the republic, it was more of an anti-regime movement than a political party, not least 
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because “it lacked any sort of vertical organization” (van Biezen 2003, 133). 
Nevertheless, Civic Forum swept the first parliamentary elections in June 1990, winning 
49.5% of the vote and 127 seats in the Czech Chamber of Deputies (hereafter, the 
Chamber).  
 Civic Forum’s success story was short-lived, however, as OF split in 1991 after 
disputes over the rapidity of the economic transition (van Biezen 2003, 134). The right-
wing faction, which advocated for rapid marketization, split off and created the Civic 
Democratic Party (ODS), headed by Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus. In the 1992 
elections, ODS, led by Klaus, won 29.7% of the votes and 66 seats in the Chamber. The 
ODS dominated the four-party coalition, which included the Civic Democratic Alliance 
(ODA), Christian Democratic Party (KDS), and the Christian Democratic Union/People’s 
Party (KDU-CSL).8  
 The subsequent parliamentary elections in 1996 consolidated the Czech party 
system, which has been dominated by four main parties: ODS, CSSD, KDU-CSL, and 
KSCM, combining for 80% of the total seats between 1992 and 2010, and over 90% 
between 1998 and 2010 (Haughton 2014, 374). 
 In the 1996 elections, ODS won 29.6% of the vote and thus obtained 68 seats in 
the Chamber. However, the right-wing coalition lost its majority after the Czech Social 
Democratic Party (CSSD) garnered 26.4% of the vote and 61 seats in the Chamber—up 
from 6.5% and 16 seats in 1992. CSSD became the leading opposition party, although the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Czechoslovakia effectively split into two countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 
on January 1, 1993.  
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party agreed to support “in principle” the ODS/ODA/KDU-CSL program,9 “to enable the 
coalition to continue in power in a minority capacity (Crawford 1996, 204). Moreover, 
the increase in support for CSSD was likely due to the “adaptive voting behavior” of the 
Czech electorate, which appeared “less-inclined to vote for smaller parties bordering the 
5% threshold” (van Biezen 2003, 136). Additionally, the Social Democrats increased in 
popularity as the electorate became increasingly dissatisfied with the ODS-led coalition 
and its government policy (van Biezen 2003, 137). Indeed, the 1996 elections were an 
important turning point in the nascent Czech party system as fragile coalitions 
disappeared and the party system saw no new entrants, which noticeably reduced 
parliamentary fragmentation resulting from the disintegration of Civic Forum and the 
general volatile environment of post-communist party systems (van Biezen 2003, 136-7).  
 Czech politics underwent its first shock in 1997 when evidence surfaced of an 
illegal funding scheme, which led to early elections after the ODS-led government was 
rocked by allegations of corruption and subsequently resigned. The scandal stemmed 
from the largest wave of state property privatization, which occurred while the ODS was 
in power. The scandal emerged in 1997 when it was discovered that, among its donors, 
there were names of two non-existent foreign donors that contributed a total of 7.5 
million CZK.10 However, the money had actually come from a businessman who won a 
tender for the purchase of a state-owned steel company. The coalition parties within the 
ODS-led government left the cabinet and the government collapsed after Vaclav Klaus, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 KDS merged with ODS on March 31, 1996 (Crawford 1996, 204).  
10 $1 is equivalent to 25.73 CZK as of April 14, 2015.	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the leader of the ODS and prime minister, refused to accept responsibility for the scandal 
(Linek and Outly 2008, 84).  
Thus, in the early elections of 1998, the Social Democrats came out on top with 
32.3% of the vote and 74 seats in the Chamber. ODS captured 63 seats after obtaining 
27.7% of the vote, and KDU-CSL received 9% of the vote, translating into 20 seats. The 
CSSD, however, was unable to form a majority government, and instead formed a 
minority government led by Milos Zeman after signing the “Agreement on Creating a 
Stable Political Environment in the Czech Republic” with the ODS—otherwise known as 
the “Opposition Agreement” (Linek and Outly 2008, 80; van Biezen 2003, 137). The 
“Opposition Agreement” ensured much-needed stability in Czech politics after the 1997 
scandal but also limited competition in the Parliament; the ODS promised to “neither 
initiate a vote of no-confidence against the minority government nor support such a vote” 
(Linek and Outly 2008, 80). Moreover, the agreement guaranteed the ODS’s involvement 
in political appointments and important governmental decisions, including the CSSD’s 
consent for electoral reform (Linek and Outly 2008, 80).  
The major electoral reform was arranged by the CSSD and the ODS in 1998, 
which sought to modify the electoral rules and restructure the allocation of state 
subsidies, both of which would have benefitted the ODS and CSSD considerably: the two 
parties would have received the bulk of state subsides at the expense of the remaining 
three parliamentary parties and the non-parliamentary parties—a combined thirty-eight 
percent decrease in support (Linek and Outly 2008, 86). While the reforms were 
approved by Parliament in 2000, the Constitutional Court subsequently struck down the 
reform package in 2001. Nonetheless, the potential reforms demonstrate a method “in 
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which elections and funding rules may be modified to the benefit of larger, [well-
established] parties” (Linek and Outly 2008, 86).  
In the 2002 Chamber elections, four formations gained representation, one of 
which was a coalition between KDU-CSL and the Freedom Union (US-DEU). A one-
vote majority cabinet was formed, consisting of the CSSD (70 seats) and the KDU-
CSL/US-DEU coalition (22 and 9 seats respectively). The ODS received 24.5% of the 
vote while the KSCM accounted for 18.5% of the vote. Despite two changes at the post 
of the prime minster from 2002-2006, the government survived until the 2006 elections 
(Linek and Outly 2008, 80).  
US-DEU saw its support disappear in the 2006 Chamber elections, and the Greens 
(SZ) passed the electoral threshold with 6.3% of the vote, winning 6 seats. A right-wing 
government was formed in early 2007 after months of political stalemate, consisting of 
the ODS (35.4%; 81 seats), KDU-CSL (7.2%; 13 seats) and SZ (6.3%; 6 seats). The 
CSSD received 32.3% of the vote (74 seats), and the KSCM garnered 12.8% of the vote 
(26 seats).  
Subsequently, in 2009, the coalition government fell after a vote of no confidence 
in March 2009, and a caretaker government was implemented after the parties failed to 
agree on a new majority cabinet (Freedom House 2010). The Parliament agreed to hold 
early elections in the fall of 2009, but the Constitutional Court struck down this 
agreement, ruling the manner in which the legislature had dissolved itself as invalid. 
Therefore, instead of holding early elections in October as the main parties had wished, 
the Court ruled the elections must be held at the end of the four-year term expiring in 
2010 (Haughton 2014, 376). Certainly, courts may play a vital role in preventing 
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cartelization to occur. By issuing such a ruling, the Court weakened the position of the 
CSSD and the ODS before elections and afforded new parties the opportunity to bolster 
their support (Haughton 2014, 376). As such, two new parties entered the Chamber after 
the 2010 elections: Public Affairs (VV) and Tradition Responsibility Prosperity 09 (TOP 
09), which managed to win 24 and 41 seats respectively. The ODS won 20.2% of the 
vote (53 seats) and formed a government with VV and TOP 09. The CSSD won 22.1% of 
the vote (56 seats), and the KSCM obtained 11.3% of the vote (26 seats).  
The 2010 elections proved to be a turning point in Czech party politics, as early 
elections in 2013 brought further change to the Czech political scene. Following a 
corruption scandal involving Prime Minister Nečas and the ODS, which surfaced in June 
2013, the government collapsed later that summer following the prime minister’s 
resignation and the failure for a technocratic government to win a vote of confidence 
from the parliament in August 2013. The early elections in October 2013 resulted in two 
new anti-corruption parties gaining representation in the Chamber: Action of Dissatisfied 
Citizens (ANO) and the Dawn of Direct Democracy (UPD, also referred to as Usvit). 
ANO burst onto the scene, garnering 18.7% of the votes (47 seats). The CSSD obtained 
20.5% of the vote (50 seats), and the KSCM received 14.9% of the vote and 33 seats in 
the Chamber. The KDU-CSL reentered the Chamber after missing out in 2010 with 6.8% 
of the vote. The ODS saw a dramatic decrease in support winning only 16 seats after 
receiving 7.7% of the vote, most likely because of the aforementioned scandal. Likewise, 
TOP 09 also lost seats after receiving 12% of the vote (26 seats). After a few months of 
negotiations, a majority government was formed consisting of the CSSD, ANO and the 
KDU-CSL.  
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In any event, it is simply too early to tell whether these two new anti-corruption 
parties—ANO and Usvit—will be able to survive long enough to fulfill their promises 
and implement reform; their success will depend on their source of financing and whether 
these former outsiders, now insiders, are willing to pursue reforms that “might work to 
their own disadvantage”  (Haughton 2014, 384). Nonetheless, the decline in support for 
the ODS, CSSD, and KDU-CSL from the 2010 to 2013 elections is a promising 
development for Czech politics, and one that may discredit any sort of cartelization 
claims in the future.11  
Non-Party Finance Laws in the Czech Republic 
 Even though four main parties have dominated Czech party politics for nearly two 
decades, the environment in which political parties operate, as Haughton (2014) 
concludes, is “largely permissive.” The Law on Elections to the Czech Parliament 
(247/1995) allows for a relatively straightforward registration process: parties need only 
1,000 signatures to register (Art. 6). Although it may be relatively simple to establish a 
party, the aforementioned law requires single parties to pass a 5% electoral threshold, and 
10%, 15%, and 20% threshold for alliances of two, three, or at least four parties, 
respectively (Art. 49).  
 As a result, few new parties have succeeded in crossing the electoral threshold: 
from 1992-2010 only three new parties (plus a splinter from ODS formed in 1998) have 
gained seats in Parliament. And following the corruption scandal and subsequent 
resignation of Prime Minister Petr Nečas in the summer of 2013, the early elections in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The KSCM is an exception to this decline of the established parties, as it continues to 
maintain a strong support base translating into continued representation in the Chamber.   
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fall 2013 brought two new outsider parties to Parliament: ANO and Usvit, both of which 
had anti-corruption appeals (Haughton 2014, 384). Nonetheless, despite the relative 
stability for nearly two decades, the elections in 2010 and 2013 have underscored the 
“fragility” of the Czech party system (Haughton 2014, 374). These new parties have 
gained ground from the established parties’ own missteps, with the former garnering 
votes through anti-corruption appeals.   
 The Czech Constitution states, “the political system is based on the free and 
voluntary origins of political parties and their free competition respecting basic 
democratic principles and rejecting force as a means of enforcing one’s interests” (Czech 
Constitution, 1992, Art. 5). Beyond this, the Czech Constitution devotes little attention to 
political parties, and does not explicitly state that political parties are separate from the 
state. However, the Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (2/1993) does 
state that “citizens have the right to form political parties and political movements and to 
associate with them,” and “political parties and political movements, as well as other 
associations, are separate from the state” (Art. 20). Yet the Law on Political Parties and 
Movements, the Constitution, and the Charter do not contain a definition of a political 
party or political movement (GRECO 2011, 3). 
 Contrary to Romania, it is doubtful that Czech non-financial party laws have 
hindered new party formation (Haughton 2014, 381). Instead, the failure of new parties to 
break through “owes much to the success of the established parties in cementing their 
support” within the lenient party finance legal framework (Haughton 2014, 382). 
Likewise, Czech parties are not as dependent on each other to enter the party system, as is 
the case in Romania; instead, issues related to party finance are crucial for party success.  
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The Development of Czech Party Finance Laws 
 Czech political parties receiving at least three percent of the vote in the previous 
elections are eligible for both a permanent and a mandate contribution from the state. The 
permanent contribution totals 6 million CZK per year, and 200,000 CZK for every 0.1 
percent of the total amount votes cast up to 5 percent of the votes—that is, up to a 
maximum of 1 million CZK (Czech Law on Political Parties 424/1991, art. 20). Parties 
surpassing the 5 percent threshold are eligible to receive a total of 10 million CZK in 
state subsidies. This amount was previously 3 million and 100,000 CZK, respectively, 
until it doubled in 2001 (Linek and Outly 2008, 85). Furthermore, political parties are 
eligible for a mandate contribution when at least one candidate has been elected to the 
Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, a regional council or the municipal council of the city 
of Prague (Czech Law 424/1991, art. 20). The amount of the mandate is 900,000 CZK 
per year per Member of Parliament (deputy or senator), and 250,000 CZK per year per 
member of a regional council or the municipal council of Prague (Czech Law 424/1991, 
art. 20).  
 In addition to the mandate and permanent contribution, the state also provides 
compensation for the Chamber elections. Parties receiving at least 1.5 percent of the total 
number of votes in most recent Chamber elections are provided 100 CZK per vote cast 
for the party (Czech Law 247/1995, art. 85). Up until 2002, the threshold for election cost 
compensation was three percent, but the Constitutional Court reduced the threshold to the 
current level after smaller parties issued complaints. Despite the reduced threshold, 
smaller parties often criticize the threshold because the subsidy is paid after an election 
and, therefore, these parties “cannot invest much in an election campaign, which further 
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reduces their chance of success” when the subsidies cover “a large portion of the 
campaign costs of larger parties” (Linek and Outly 2008, 86).  
 Czech political parties are required to submit annual reports to the Chamber of 
Deputies each year, and the reports are required to be available to the public (Czech Law 
424, art. 18(6)). Within the annual reports, political parties must report all donors 
regardless of the amount donated, even though Czech Law 424/1991 does not explicitly 
stipulate this (GRECO 2011, 9). Despite the fact that these reports are made public, “the 
fact that the supervisory body is the lower parliamentary chamber is its main problem: the 
controlling body consists of the same entities that are controlled” (Linek and Outly 2008, 
88). 
 In fact, Czech law is less rigorous in regulating private contributions than 
Romania, and allows for corporate and trade union donations to both parties and 
individual candidates. Although the Czech Republic bans corporations with government 
contracts or partial government ownership from donating to political parties, no such 
provision exists for individual candidates (GRECO 2011, 9; 19). Additionally, the Czech 
Republic does not place a limit on the amount a donor can contribute to a political party 
in an election or non-election year (GRECO 2011, 9). Certainly, without any sort of 
regulation regarding donations, “the [other] rules regulating party funding can thus be 
evaded through the direct funding of candidates (Linek and Outly 2008, 85). 
 The following section will provide a discussion of cartelization emerging from 
these laws, which will demonstrate how the Czech Republic exhibits a more conventional 
cartel party system.  
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Cartelization in the Czech Republic 
 Transparency International (TI) released a report in December 2011 regarding the 
integrity of various institutions in the Czech Republic. The report lays out the legal 
provisions of each institution and examines these provisions in practice. Czech political 
parties “function more like a marketplace for various privileges” instead of acting as a 
“source of visions and solutions for society-wide problems” (TI 2011, 130). Political 
parties exploit the existing loopholes in the law, especially within the realm of party 
funding. The lack of financial oversight and reporting of expenditure allow the parties “to 
accept unlimited amounts from private sponsors” (TI 2011, 130). Moreover, Czech law 
does not regulate campaign expenditures, which has contributed to the rising costs of 
elections. As a result, Czech parties often resort to illegal methods to fund their 
campaigns, most of which “involve corrupt practices, result in further strengthening of 
clientelistic networks, and lead to the cartelization of parties and weaken the linkage 
between parties and voters” (TI 2011, 130; emphasis added).  
 This report follows Haughton’s (2014) observation of a “permissive 
environment,” which has ultimately acted as a restraint on small and new parties alike: 
the main political parties receive a significant amount of state money helping them 
solidify their positions while leaving smaller, “outsider” parties without state support. In 
turn, these outsiders must seek substantial amounts of party revenue from private 
sources—which is left largely unregulated in the Czech Republic—leaving these parties 
vulnerable to accusations of corruption associated with the “rich benefactors who 
bankroll their activities” when they are dependent on non-state sources of revenue 
(Haughton 2014, 373). Therefore, the Czech Republic, although largely permissive in its 
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regulation, serves as a more conventional example of the cartel party theory vis-à-vis 
Romania.  
 While the reported campaign expenditures exceed the amount of state 
contributions, in reality, TI reports, the actual campaign expenditures may be much 
higher: anonymous sponsors who do not appear in the annual party reports “may actually 
act as a cover for funds that in fact come from public resources” since some election 
expenditures are not recorded in official accounts (TI 2011, 133-134). Although 
donations to political parties are to be included in the annual reports regardless of the 
amount, political parties need not disclose membership donations less than 50,000 CZK. 
In effect, some parties treat donations as membership fees, therefore circumventing the 
disclosure requirements. Clearly this is problematic, as members of the parties may 
receive private donations and split these donations into “membership fees,” which need 
not be reported if such contributions are under the 50,000 CZK threshold. The Czech 
Law on Political Parties fails to provide any precise definition as to what constitutes a 
gift, a donation, or a membership fee. Accordingly, parties are able to treat member 
donations as membership fees (GRECO 2011, 17). 
 Furthermore, despite sufficient legal safeguards ensuring the “institutional 
independence of political parties” within Czech law, in practice their independence is 
“threatened by their own methods of operation”—namely, their “interconnectedness with 
particular economic interests” (TI 2011, 135). And although the Czech Republic’s public 
funding scheme is generous, “political parties are to a large extent dependent on other 
sources of income” due in part to the rising costs of elections (TI 2011, 135). In essence, 
the failure to cap campaign expenditures has proved advantageous for established parties, 
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and also forces smaller parties to find other, possibly illegal, sources of revenue in order 
to compete in elections, as they receive a miniscule amount of state support in relation to 
the established parties.  
 TI (2011, 142) also examined interest aggregation and representation and found 
that political parties in the Czech Republic “have become, to a great extent, firms that 
promote personal and group interests of their managers on national, regional and 
municipal levels.” Moreover, TI emphasizes that parties’ main purpose is “not to promote 
ideas, values, and interests of certain social groups” but rather “to ensure economic profit 
and power for a narrow group of party managers” (TI 2011, 142). As a result, political 
parties’ anti-corruption rhetoric has only raised the public’s awareness of the problem and 
has made citizens “even more disgusted with politics in general” (TI 2011, 144).   
 Indeed, political parties are not so much interested in political competition but 
rather in “fulfilling some specific objectives”; the current system of political party 
financing creates an environment “that is conducive to cartelization of the established 
parties” whose main goal is to suppress competition (TI 2011, 133). Likewise, as 
Haughton (2014, 373) contends, “the existing framework has in the main served the 
established parties well and helps to underpin the largely oligopolistic nature of Czech 
party politics.” 
Application of Institutional Corruption  
 In the Czech Republic the design problem lies within the party finance laws, and 
one significant flaw is the failure to cap campaign expenditures. Parties must raise a 
substantial amount of money from private sources to fund their campaigns and compete 
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in elections. And instead of providing a more level playing field, public funding props up 
established parties, allowing them to continually raise the costs of elections. The problem 
can be seen more clearly when comparing an established party to an outsider seeking to 
break in: outsider parties often need to raise much more money to fund their campaigns, 
and given the low level of the electorate’s involvement (low party membership, 
identification, donations, etc.), these parties are left to acquire money from those willing 
to donate, which may indeed be those interested in donating in the first place—namely, 
individuals or groups who expect something in return. The established parties’ access to 
the state drives this phenomenon, as they have a solid foundation (the state) from which 
they build on; this is exacerbated by the loopholes in the laws that allow for shady 
donations without proper oversight. Instead of acting as a mechanism for fair competition 
among political parties and eliminating the influence of private money, state access—
particularly state subsidies—produces a playing field that is indeed unbalanced and 
drives political parties, insiders and outsiders alike, to seek private funds to compete in 
elections. The lack of transparency and the reporting requirements facilitate this practice, 
as it is easy to circumvent the system.  
 The permissive environment noted by Haughton, who states it has ultimately been 
restrictive for smaller parties, allows for established parties to use the state to their 
advantage and solidify their position in the system. Public funding and the party 
regulation (or lack thereof) is a design problem because the goals of public funding are 
not being accomplished, which in turn suggests that political parties are not able to 
achieve their institutional purpose. The design of the Czech system allows for party drift: 
the failure to cap expenditures and contributions, the existing loopholes in the laws, and 
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toothless oversight mechanisms allow parties to use the state as a means to pursue their 
own interests rather than those of the electorate. Indeed, poor oversight and a lack of 
transparency may be the most influential factor in generating party drift. On the one hand, 
parties are not held in check and are able to stray from their institutional purpose with 
relative ease. On the other hand, a lack of transparency fosters suspicion among the 
electorate and parties subsequently lose their legitimacy as citizens’ perception of 
corruption increases (Kostadinova 2007). Thus, institutional corruption in the Czech 
Republic may occur through two of Oliveira’s mechanisms: work-breakdown structure or 
motivating for the goal. Public funding has not necessarily mitigated the importance of 
private funding, which can be seen as a breakdown in the design, and diverts parties from 
their ascribed purpose. Likewise, the current design forces small and new parties 
receiving little state support to find alternative sources of income in order to compete in 
elections with the hope of joining the cartel. Therefore, state access is the reward while 
passing the public funding threshold becomes the goal these parties strive to achieve due 
to the design problem.  
 As this chapter has demonstrated, the design problem in the Czech Republic 
differs slightly than Romania. The following chapter will briefly review the two cases 
and propose a few general conclusions about possibly bringing together the cartel party 
thesis and institutional corruption theory into a combined theoretical framework.  
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Chapter V: Conclusion 
 While the main premise of the cartel party theory is parties are growing closer to 
the state at the expense of the electorate, it has been difficult to establish a quantitative 
“disconnect” between parties and civil society (see Casal Bertoa et al. 2014). Therefore, 
this study seeks to explore a qualitative assessment of this trend, demonstrating that 
citizen disaffection has developed as a result of institutional corruption. Parties are not 
held in high regard among citizens, as citizens feel as if they are being under-represented, 
which has led to an increase in citizen disconnect and disaffection with politics (Popescu 
and Soare 2014, 390). The intent of this paper is to try to fill the gap by framing 
cartelization as a problem of institutional design—namely cartelization acts as drift, 
leading parties away from their institutional purpose while simultaneously enhancing 
citizen distrust. 
 As a reminder, institutional corruption is defined as the “condition in which an 
institution does not achieve its purpose because its very design induces its members to 
work for other goals” (Oliveira 2014, 16). Two traits are therefore present: 1) the ascribed 
goals (and thus the ascribed purpose) are not being achieved; and 2) this happens because 
the very design of the organization is leading members to work for other goals. 
Therefore, “when the design has problems, even perfect execution by individuals would 
not achieve the desired goals” (Oliveira 2014, 15). 
 Political parties are meant to act as representative agencies whose legitimacy 
stems from their ability to articulate their voters’ interests and aggregate their demands 
(Kopecky 2006, 251). As such, this can be the ascribed purpose of political parties. Yet 
the high degree of abstraction of such a purpose makes it challenging to measure 
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‘disconnect’ or ‘proper representation’. Therefore, one must examine the institution’s 
goals that are laid out in order to achieve its ascribed purpose; thus the achievement of 
these goals allows for an institution to maintain its course and achieve its purpose. To 
illustrate this concept, think of a ladder: each rung on the ladder is a goal and the top of 
the ladder is the ascribed institutional purpose; the rungs are the only way to reach the top 
of the ladder. For purposes of this paper, the top of the ladder is the ascribed purpose of 
political parties: to act as representative agencies and bridge society and the state. Thus, 
one “rung” set out by states to reach the top of the “ladder” is public funding, which in 
theory is implemented to safeguard proper representation, provide a level playing field 
and guarantee a fair political process, and ultimately diminish the potentially harmful 
influence of privately interested money in politics.   
 However, political parties fail to achieve this goal and thus their purpose when 
they seek to maintain their position through cartelization and ultimately use state access 
to their advantage. As a result, cartelization acts as a drift by which parties are diverted 
from their ascribed purpose, as parties seek to accomplish other goals and serve their self-
interest. What’s more, parties are able to use their state access to secure additional private 
funds and crowd out potential competitors. The costs of conducting campaigns are high, 
and achieving re-election and garnering votes is an expensive endeavor. As such, gaining 
access to the state as well as supplementing party revenues with state subsidies can create 
a drift from their purpose: if parties act in their own interest and seek to form a cartel, 
rather than serve the interests of the electorate, then political parties become corrupt as 
institutions.  
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 Indeed, institutional corruption can take place in different contexts, and Oliveira’s 
model is helpful for demonstrating cartelization as drift in the case studies, as the Czech 
Republic and Romania exhibit two different types of cartel party systems. Nevertheless, 
the cases have shown the continued importance of private funding despite the existence 
of public funding schemes. Moreover, the cases demonstrate the variation in which the 
drift occurs: the Czech Republic’s design problem rests within the party finance laws, 
while Romania’s non-finance party laws force political parties away from their ascribed 
purpose.  
 The Czech Republic’s design problem stems from a combination of elements 
within its party finance laws, all of which prove advantageous for the established parties. 
The failure to cap campaign expenditures, poor oversight, and ambiguity within 
contribution regulations diminish the importance of public funding for new and small 
parties; the established parties are also able to crowd out competitors by raising the 
election expenditures and using state revenue as a foundation to build upon. Moreover, 
smaller parties are often victims of corruption allegations when they are heavily 
dependent on alternative sources of revenue.  
 Meanwhile, the Romanian design problem largely originates from its non-
financial party laws, particularly the high registration requirements coupled with the 
increased electoral threshold over time. Indeed, these elements are particularly 
problematic considering the relatively low level of public funding provided to all 
Romanian political parties. Therefore, the non-finance laws encourage the drift, as small 
and new parties alike are forced to seek inclusion in a coalition by making themselves 
financially attractive to the established parties rather than serving the needs and 
	   54	  
articulating the demands of the voters. In addition, given the low level of citizen 
engagement, parties attempting to ‘break in’ may be motivated to circumvent the system 
and secure private funds illegally. Nonetheless, the complex and ambiguous party laws 
allow for loopholes to be exploited by ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ alike, which facilitates 
cartelization as institutional drift. Indeed, the absence of strict enforcement mechanisms, 
and a lack of transparency regarding party finance more generally, seriously damages 
“the image of parties as representatives of the public interest” (Kostadinova 2007, 807).  
 Finally, the case studies illustrate the fine line between stabilization and 
exploitation—that is, the difference between an institution that achieves its prescribed 
purpose and one that does not. In both cases, especially Romania, laws were passed under 
the guise of promoting stability while the perception of corruption and citizen distrust 
remained high. In fact, it is plausible to suggest this “stability” is largely artificial in that 
parties seek to “stabilize” their own positions by way of cartelization and hence state 
exploitation. Party politics in post-communist Europe is a “potentially self-reinforcing 
process…[and] because political parties either cannot or do not wish to function as 
effective representative agencies, they are forced to seek their resources elsewhere” 
(Kopecky 2006, 254). However, post-communist states are not predestined to 
cartelization even though they may be predisposed to it (Kopecky 2006, 254; see also 
O’Dwyer 2006).  
 Oliveira (2014, 16) argues that every problem of institutional design will not lead 
to institutional corruption: institutional corruption manifests itself when the design 
undermines the institutional purpose by making its members work for other goals. 
Therefore, even though a party system may possess a design problem that facilitates 
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cartelization, political parties may not necessarily be inclined to entrench themselves and 
suppress competition. Indeed, it may be possible to differentiate between stabilization 
and exploitation by placing the cartel party thesis into Oliveira’s model and framing 
cartelization as institutional drift in order to determine whether parties have failed to act 
as representative agencies for the electorate at large.  
 Nevertheless, as this paper is a preliminary exploration of institutional corruption 
and party drift, some questions remain. Recent elections in the Czech Republic may have 
shaken the party system and have potentially broken the cartel, although it is too early to 
tell whether the new parties will be able to implement anti-corruption reforms and fulfill 
their promises to the citizens. Likewise, it is also too early to tell whether these parties 
will fall prey to the design flaws pointed out above and work for other goals. As Oliveira 
states: The key distinction between institutional and individual corruption is 
“ineffectiveness due to performance and that due to design” (Oliveira 2014, 15). 
Therefore, “when the design has problems, even perfect execution by individuals would 
not achieve the desired goals” (Oliveira 2014, 15). New parties, particularly in the Czech 
Republic, may fail to fulfill their ascribed purpose due to a design problem. On the other 
hand, Oliveira also acknowledges that not every design problem will lead to institutional 
corruption, as institutional drift is not inevitable insofar as members continue achieving 
goals necessary to accomplish their institutional purpose (Oliveira 2014, 16).  
 Additional social survey data is needed to underscore the growing rift between 
parties and citizens, and may also help illuminate the nuances involved with public trust 
and party legitimacy because it is possible that voter turnout may fall short in expressing 
the various aspects of public trust. This underscores the need for both qualitative and 
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quantitative methods to flesh out whether a complex theory of organizational design, 
cartelization, and institutional corruption can be applied more broadly. And finally, 
further examination regarding the politicization of the state (i.e., patronage and 
clientelism, politicization of the state administration, etc.) is needed to advance this 
framework beyond party finance laws. Other indicators of party-state linkages will help 
illustrate alternative methods used by parties to entrench themselves within the state. 
Thus, future research should examine the party-state linkage beyond party finance 
to further develop the concept of cartelization as institutional drift, with special attention 
on patronage and clientelism, which may be crucial for parties seeking alternative 
resources to solidify their position within the party system (see Kopecky 2006; Kopecky 
and Spirova 2011). In addition, social survey data would be useful to highlight the 
growing rift between parties and citizens. Further research also ought to explore state-
building dynamics and party rent-seeking behavior in post-communist European 
countries vis-à-vis Oliveira’s institutional corruption model (see Grzymala-Busse 2007; 
O’Dwyer 2006).   
 Finally, a potential paradox may hinder this proposed theoretical framework’s 
application. In post-communist Europe, parties and the electorate were never “close” to 
begin with and the relationship between parties and voters has remained weak since the 
beginning of the post-communist transition, save for the communist successor parties 
Roper 2008, 7). Thus, it is unclear to what extent this growing party-state linkage can be 
seen as increasing—hence a form of institutional corruption—or whether this party-state 
linkage has merely remained the same over time. Parties are ultimately dependent the 
electorate for votes, but they may be able to get by without being particularly responsive 
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to the demands of the broader electorate, specifically by relying on their base and using 
the state as a means to ensure their survival. In order to get a more precise read on the 
situation, it would be useful to disaggregate public opinion and the different dimensions 
of party-citizen linkage. At the same time, this disaggregation will also help explain to 
what extent corruption perceptions and public trust are related to the type of party 
funding model or party system design in a particular country.  
 Indeed, many post-communist constitutions “have de jure elevated parties to the 
position of an essential institutional infrastructure of democracy” despite the fact that 
parties are “de facto neither particularly stable, nor highly valued or desired by either the 
elite or the citizens” (Kopecky 2006, 270). Nevertheless, this new theoretical framework, 
although preliminary, may help to disentangle this paradox and highlight this growing 
disconnect: parties are expected to serve a particular purpose by law, but instead are held 
in low regard because citizens perceive the political parties to be working for alternative 
goals or purposes than those ascribed.  
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